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1. Introduction 
Microfinance has become a prominent element of development strategies. Over the last 
two decades microcredit
1 programs have expanded rapidly, firstly in Bangladesh and 
then around the developing world. Most development practitioners and policy makers 
believe that microfinance can help the poor to break out of poverty. The academic world 
has also shown increased interest in microfinance. A great deal has been written on 
microfinance theory (see, for example, Chowdhury 2005 and the reference therein).
2
Much of this literature has focused on joint liability group lending and its implications 
for reducing information asymmetries. In spite of the abundance of theoretical literature, 
empirical work on the impact of microfinance is relatively sparse compared to the 
worldwide scale of the operation of these programs (Armendáriz de Aghion and 
Morduch 2005, Herms and Lensink 2007).  
Bangladesh’s microfinance sector is remarkable for the speed with which it grew to its 
present size and prominence. This paper evaluates the impact of microcredit 
participation on household consumption using a large, nationally representative and 
unique cross-section data set from Bangladesh. The data comes from a survey conducted 
by the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS) for the Palli Karma-
Sahayak Foundation (PKSF, Rural Employment Support Foundation) specifically for 
the purposes of evaluating microfinance programs in Bangladesh.
3 The survey 
encompasses a wide variety of information at the household, village and organization 
level. It includes 3026 households comprising households in the program and control 
groups, covering 91 villages spread over 23 thanas (sub-districts). This is the largest 
survey of microfinance households ever conducted in Bangladesh, and possibly in the 
world. 
The existing evidence on the impact of the microcredit program in Bangladesh is 
ambiguous. Different identification strategies have yielded different conclusions. The 
best-known impact evaluation study of microfinance by Pitt and Khandker (1998) (PK 
from here on) finds that access to microfinance significantly increases consumption and 
1  In this paper the terms ‘microcredit’ and ‘microfinance’ are used interchangeably.  
2 The reader can consult the “Group lending” special issues of the Journal of Development Economics, 
1999, vol. 60(1), pp.1-269, and Economic Journal, 2007, vol. 117(517), pp. F1-F133.  
3 The data collection and preliminary analysis were supported by the World Bank. PKSF, established in 
May 1990, works as an organization for MFIs. The micro-lending community regards it as a regulatory 
agency and it exercises its authority over the MFIs.  2
reduces poverty. However, Morduch (1998), using PK’s dataset but different estimation 
methodology, finds that access to microfinance has an insignificant, or even negative, 
effect on the household welfare. More recently Madajewicz (2003), using the same 
dataset but again a different estimation methodology, finds results similar to those 
obtained by Morduch (1998).
4
Using panel data from Bangladesh, Khandker (2005) finds a significantly weaker effect 
of microfinance participation than found in earlier cross-sectional studies (undertaken by 
the same author). The results also cast doubt on the optimistic 5 percent drop in 
poverty by the PK study. In the case of Thailand, Coleman (1999) finds that the 
average program impact is insignificant on physical assets, savings, and expenditure on 
education and health care. Kaboski and Townsend (2005) find institutions with good 
policies can promote asset growth, consumption smoothing and decrease the reliance on 
moneylenders in Thailand. However, they find no measurable impacts of the joint 
liability or repayment frequency. Karlan and Zinman (2008) examine the impact of 
expanding access to consumer credit using data gathered from a field experiment in 
South Africa. Their results indicate significant and positive effects on income, food 
consumption, and job retention.
We estimate both the effect of participating in microfinance programs (the treatment on 
the treated effect) and the effect of being offered the chance to participate in a 
microfinance program (the intention-to-treat effect). The intention-to-treat (ITT) effect 
suggests a smaller positive effect of assignment (eligibility). A good number of eligible 
households in the treatment village did not participate while some non-eligible (non-
encouraged) households participated in the program. In our case, assignment (an 
eligibility criterion) is merely an encouragement to take treatment and there is non-
compliance among those encouraged. So we use two different techniques to address the 
issue of selection bias, and to link ITT effects to treatment effects. We first use an IV 
4 PK use an instrumental variable (IV) approach considering the choice based sampling, and employ the 
weighted exogenous sampling maximum likelihood (WESML) estimator of Manski and Lerman (1977). 
PK’s IV approach is parallel to the use of limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) and village 
fixed effects (FE), and thus called their estimate  LIML-WESML-FE. Morduch (1998), on the other hand, 
applies a simple difference-in-difference (DD) approach. Madajewicz (2003) uses an IV method which is 
very similar to that of PK’s method, but she estimates the impact of lending programs on business profits 
of borrowers by poverty status. According to Greene (2000), “WESML and choice based sampling method 
are not the free  lunch they may appear to be. In fact, what the biased sampling does, the weighting 
undoes”, p.823. Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch (2005) argues that despite PK use heavier statistical 
artillery than other microfinance studies it does not mean that they deliver results that are more reliable or 
rigorous than others. 3
approach, where the instruments are generated by village level program placement and 
by an eligibility rule for receiving microfinance. We also exploit the variation in the 
amount of credit borrowed across households of different villages - a feature that has not 
yet been utilized - based on the exposure to the program. The second approach uses the 
propensity score matching (PSM) method of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). Here treated 
are compared with matched untreated (based on propensity scores), while controlling for 
the characteristics used by the MFIs to select the households and other observable 
household characteristics that are potential determinants of participation in 
microfinance. We find a substantially lower effect on consumption applying matching 
methods than implied by the IV approach.  
Improving economic well-being is the main objective of microfinance programs. Food 
consumption expenditure accounts for more than 70 percent of total household spending 
among the poor in the rural areas of Bangladesh.
5 Overall, the results suggest that the 
effects of microfinance loans on food consumption expenditure are not robust across all 
groups of poor household borrowers. We find evidence against the “common effect” 
assumption using the analysis on subgroups. The results overwhelmingly support the 
fact that the poorest of the poor benefit most from participating in microfinance. The 
impacts are lower, or sometimes even negative, for those households marginal to the 
participation decision. The effects of participation are, in general, stronger for male 
borrowers. The empirical findings hold across different specifications and methods, and 
when corrected for various sources of selection bias including possible spillover effects.
2. The Program, the Data and the Descriptives 
2.1 The Program and the Context 
The microfinance sector of Bangladesh is one of the largest and oldest programs of the 
world.
6 The growth in the MFI sector, in terms of the number of MFIs as well as total 
membership, was phenomenal during the 1990s and is continuing. The PKSF was 
established with a view to monitor the activities of these large numbers of MFI, and to 
lend out donor and other funds to its partner organisations (POs) for microcredit. In 
5 P oor households’ savings in rural areas of Bangladesh is very negligible. Our hypothesis is that if 
household income increases significantly to affect their permanent income level, households’ consumption 
expenditure will increase. Moreover, difficulties with collecting income data are well-known, especially from 
the developing countries. 
6 Around one quarter of the world’s micro-credit customers are in Bangladesh with a further quarter in 
India (State of the microcredit summit campaign report 2006). 4
2004 PKSF funds made up about 17% of the total microfinance industry in Bangladesh, 
which was 24% in 1998.
7
Previous studies on microfinance in Bangladesh have primarily focused on GB (PK; 
Morduch 1998, 1999). However, expansion, competition and funding constraints have 
greatly changed the recent dynamics of microfinance in Bangladesh. For example, the 
Association for Social Advancement (ASA), which started its microfinance operations in 
1991, has now become a dominant MFI in terms of number of beneficiaries and loan 
disbursement. Similarly, Proshikha has been able to increase its outreach remarkably 
during the 1990s reaching about 2.8 million borrowers by 2001. During that period the 
number of medium and small MFIs has grown from a very small base to more than a 
thousand institutions. In view of the growing importance of the non-GB MFIs in 
Bangladesh, in this study, we use a completely different set of data from thirteen MFIs 
of PKSF. The organizations investigated here are different from those studied 
previously, but include organisations that are very large in terms of loan disbursements 
and area of coverage, most notably the ASA and Proshikha. ASA provides both credit 
and savings services on a remarkably large scale. Proshika is the fourth largest 
microcredit program in Bangladesh. Notable other MFIs which we study here include 
the Society for Social sServices (SSS) and Thengamar Mohila Sabuj Sangha (TMSS). As 
of December 2004, SSS is the tenth largest MFI in Bangladesh in terms of cumulative 
disbursements and outstanding borrowers. TMSS is one of the top fifty MFIs in 
Bangladesh. The other MFIs are relatively small and have similar types of program 
activities. All of these MFIs follow the GB-style lending procedure and typically give 
access to microfinance to households having less than 50 decimals of land. Credit is 
given mainly to groups of people who are jointly liable for repayment of the loan, and 
there is no collateral requirement. Loans are primarily advanced for any profitable and 
socially acceptable income generating activity. The amount of a loan usually lies within 
the range US$40 - $160. However, members may take larger loans after repaying their 
first loan.
2.2 The Data and Survey Design 
The data was collected initially to monitor and assess the impact of microfinance 
programs undertaken by MFIs of the PKSF. BIDS was responsible for the collection of 
data on behalf of PKSF. The survey includes 13 MFIs, each from a different district, 
7 See <http://www.bwtp.org>. 5
covering 91 villages spread over 23 thanas. Following a census of all households in the 91 
villages during October 1997, the survey was administered in early 1998. Besides 
collecting detailed information at the household level, separate modules were 
administered at the village and institution level.  
The survey was conducted to obtain a nationally representative dataset for the 
evaluation of microfinance programs in Bangladesh. The selection of MFIs was intended 
to capture the various areas of operation and coverage. Since MFIs were not operating 
in all thana, selection of thana within the district of each MFI was made followed by 
village selection. The geographic coverage of the survey was spread evenly over 
Bangladesh, and the thana level comparisons revealed that selected thanas were not 
different from the average (Mahmud 2003). Within a MFI area, the selection of villages 
involved visiting the MFI local offices and interviewing some key informants to prepare 
a list of all villages in the area and compile village specific information regarding: type of 
MFI-activities; number of MFI groups; number of borrowers; infrastructure condition; 
and existence of other MFIs. Upon obtaining the information, a sample of villages under 
each of the selected MFI was drawn through stratified random sampling. The 
stratification was based on the presence or absence of microfinance activity. The non-
program villages were selected among neighbouring villages. 
Of the 13 selected MFIs, two were deliberately chosen from the large category (e.g., 
Proshika and ASA).  Secondly, thanas were selected when more than one thana was 
covered by the MFIs. Then, two control villages and six programme villages were chosen 
from each of the MFI areas. However, since non-program villages could not be found 
under some of the MFIs, only 11 non-program villages could be included. So six to eight 
villages from each MFI were selected depending on the availability of control villages. In 
selecting the survey households, the universe of households in program villages, drawn 
from the census, was grouped according to their eligibility status. A household is said to 
be eligible if it owns 50 decimals (half-acre) or less of cultivable land. Participation was 
defined in terms of current membership as reported in the census in 1997. From the 
village census list, 34 households were drawn from each program and non-program 
village. Because the census found a good number of ineligible households in program 
villages the sample was drawn so as to maintain the proportion of eligible and ineligible 
households at about 12:5. The sample size within program and control villages was 6
determined accordingly.
8 A total of 3026 households were drawn from program and 
control villages including 1740 participants. Of the 1286 non-participants, 277 were from 
control villages and 1009 were from program villages. Because of the absence of 
appropriate control villages, more non-participants were drawn from program villages.
9
The samples from control villages (the control group) include those households whose 
heads expressed their willingness to participate (during census) in MFI programs, if 
available. Among the total surveyed households 2051 are eligible representing 67.7 
percent of all households. The same proportion is also surveyed in the program village: 
1835 are eligible out of 2735 households. Of the total number of 1740 borrowers 207 are 
men.
2.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 contains the descriptive statistics for different village level characteristics. It 
shows that there are no systematic differences in terms of education and health 
characteristics. Among transport and communication facilities, there are differences in 
terms of the presence of sxffd (brick-built) roads in the village (35 percent in program 
villages as opposed to 11 percent in the control villages) and the distance of the village 
from the nearest thana (the program villages are relatively closer to the thana). Also the 
program village has better electricity facilities than the control village. There are no 
statistically significant differences between program and control villages in terms of 
bazaar (market place for grocery), post office and telephone office. However, there is a 
relatively higher presence of money-lenders in the program villages. In terms of 
irrigation facilities, no statistically significant differences were found, though in all cases 
program villages have better facilities as indicated by the higher average 
number/proportion of facilities per village. Overall we see that program villages are 
more developed in terms of infrastructure and other related facilities.  
Table 2 provides key descriptive statistics for the household level variables.  It shows 
that the average landholding for the non-treated households is significantly higher than 
the treated households. For household size, both Kolmogorov-Smirnov (N-V) and w-tests
suggest that it is different between treatment and comparison households. There are also 
some differences between many household characteristics of treatment and comparison 
8 The sample size and its ratio between participating and non-participating households are different in a 
few villages because of the absence of the required number of appropriate households in each group. 
9 Khandker (2005) also highlights the limitation of getting the control villages in Bangladesh. He finds that 
the villages that were controls in 1991-92 in his survey, all became program villages by 1997-98.7
groups as indicated by s-values and N-V tests, but these differences are minimal when 
we consider only the eligible group of households (households owning less than half acre 
of land). In fact, many of the characteristics are also very similar for samples of 
households with up to one acre of land (not shown here). Overall the findings here are 
that the differences between treatment and comparison households are not systematic; 
however, the treated group has a higher average household size, more children and its 
members tend to be less educated.  
Table 3 presents summary statistics of food consumption and credit variables. 
Consumption expenditure data include expenditures of food consumed in the reference 
period. The information covers a wide range and types (e.g. food purchased, home 
produced) of food consumption, and is as good as the standard LSMS food consumption 
module.  Table 3 suggests that there are no statistically significant differences between 
treated and non-treated groups of households in terms of food consumption, though non-
treated groups have a little more household and per-capita consumption levels than the 
treated group. However, when we consider consumption expenditure by household 
landownership, total household monthly consumption expenditure is higher for treated 
households having two acres or less land (Figure 1a). Household consumption 
expenditures for both groups are a monotonically increasing function of household’s land 
ownership. On a shu-fdslwd basis, non-treated households have higher consumption 
expenditure than the treated group (Figure 1b). Household level monthly food 
consumption expenditures between program and control villages show that they are not 
different (Table 3). However, when we consider shu-fdslwd monthly consumption 
expenditure, households in control villages have slightly higher consumption than those 
in program villages. Table 3 also shows that villages with male borrowers borrowed 
more than their female counterparts. Households with male participants also have, on 
average, a higher number of members in microfinance and have more exposure (length of 
membership in microfinance) to the program. They also have higher consumption at 
both the household and shu-fdslwdlevels, and the differences between these consumption 
measures for female borrowers are statistically significant.
10
10 A treated household consists of either male or female member but not both in our sample. Groups are 
never mixed by genders. A MFI selects the gender of the treatment group, and households do not have a 
choice of whether male or female will participate. 8
3. Empirical Strategy 
There are a number of different potential sources of bias that need to be accounted for 
to examine the effect of participation in microfinance. First, participants are likely to 
differ from non-participants in the distribution of observed characteristics, leading to a 
“selection-on-observables” bias. There are also problems due to “selection-on-
unobservables”–programs may be placed in a non-random sample of villages, and 
households may self-select into the program (and subsequently decide on how much to 
borrow). For example, the program village might be poorer than the control village. 
Microfinance programs are targeted to poor households. A prospective member decides 
that he/she wants to participate in the microfinance program. The potential participant 
also has to be approved by officials of MFI. Households are therefore self-selected into 
the program. Thus there are likely to be observable and unobservable differences in 
characteristics between participants and non-participants.  
However, it is likely that the MFIs choose the program village based on some observable 
characteristics. There are many MFIs working in Bangladesh. If local officials of one 
MFI use some information then other MFIs would try to use the same and so it should 
be known to researchers interacting both with officials and borrowers. Discussions with 
program officials at the local-office levels indicate that programs are designed by the 
head office. It also appears that local branch managers and officials of MFIs are not 
from the same area where the program is located. This is also discouraged by PKSF, the 
supervising body of the MFIs we are studying, since it may induce loan selection to the 
employees’ relatives or acquaintances. There are also specific guidelines from the head-
office to select the program villages. Given the size of the microfinance program and the 
number of MFIs working in Bangladesh, it is reasonable to assume that village level 
program placement is a problem of “selection-on-observables”.
11 We use a wide range of 
village-level controls to address the village level selection. We also use MFI level fixed 
effects to deal with the problem of unobserved heterogeneity across different MFIs. 
These MFI level-fixed effects also partially control for unobserved factors across different 
geographic areas. With controls for village and fixed effects, we assume that there are no 
contemporaneous village level unobservables that are correlated with microfinance 
program placement in a village and household’s consumption expenditure. 
11 Gauri and Fruttero (2003) find that NGO programs in Bangladesh are not targeted at the poor villages, 
and NGOs do not respond to local community needs. Their findings indicate that non-random selection of 
villages by NGOs (which mainly include MFIs) is not an important issue in Bangladesh. 9
However, identification also requires controlling for the endogeneity that arises from 
household self-selection into the program. So, even conditional on a set of observed 
covariates,  X, there could be some unobservable factors that may determine a 
household’s decision to join a microfinance program. This could be entrepreneurial 
ability, information advantage, attitudes, traditions, customs or family culture, etc. In 
order to understand the difficulties inherent in estimating the treatment effect of 
participation or credit, assume that the consumption of household l in village m can be 
described as: 
(1)  \ lm= ʌ1Glm+ *1[1l+ *2[2m+ ɽlm
where X1l is a vector of household specific variables, and X2m is a vector of village-specific 
characteristics. Glm=1 if household l is a member of microfinance and Glm= 0 if l is not. 
(Alternatively, for identifying the effect of credit, Glm is the amount of microcredit 
borrowed by household l in village m). Selection into microfinance programs on the basis 
of unobserved characteristics, ɽlm, by households may generate a non-zero correlation 
between ɽlm and Glm. Therefore treatment effect estimated using OLS may not reflect the 
program’s causal effect on household consumption. 
To solve the problem of endogeneity we consider IV estimation techniques. We utilize 
the program eligibility criterion set by the MFIs, and use it as an instrument for 
participation. The eligibility rule is not completely followed so the treatment does not 
change from zero to one at the threshold of eligibility. If treatment was deterministic 
with respect to the eligibility rule, we could compare outcomes of households clustered 
just below the cut-off line to those just above, and apply the regression discontinuity 
(RD) design directly. Figure 2a shows that the participation rate falls sharply once 
households cross the threshold level of half-acre land, but it does not fall from one to 
zero. The eligibility rule could not be applied for many practical considerations, some of 
which are mentioned below. It therefore raises concern that there could be some 
variables observed by the loan officer but unobserved by the evaluator. So, we apply an 
approach which can be seen as an lqgluhfw application of (fuzzy) RD design (see Van 
der Klaauw 2002). Unlike sharp RD design, selection into microfinance program in fuzzy 
design is based on both observables and unobservables. We implement RD approach 
using IV approach such as those used by Angrist and Lavy (1999). 10
Figure 2a illustrates that eligible households residing in a program village have higher 
chances to join in a microcredit program (70 percent participants are eligible). It 
therefore seems reasonable to think of eligibility status in a program village as an 
instrument for program participation. Formally, define Vm as the presence of a program 
in a village m and Hl is a variable which takes the value of 1 if the household is eligible 
i.e. owns less than half acre of land, and zero otherwise. So our instrument is Zlm=Vm×El,
where Zlm = 1 if the household lives in the program village and is eligible. The eligibility 
criterion and program placement are exogenous to the household and hence our 
instrument is ‘as good as randomly assigned’. 
Therefore our identifying assumption is that household lm’s participation, or the amount 
of credit borrowed, Dlm, in microfinance is governed by: 

(2)     Glm= Į1]lm+ *3[1l+ *4[2m+ Ȧlm
where X1 and X2 are the same as in equation (1) and Ȧlm is the household-specific error 
term embodying the unobserved influences on Glm. We assume that ] and [ are 
exogenous with respect to ɽlm and Ȧlm. We also examine whether there is a differential 
effect of credit borrowed by male and female borrowers.  
Are we using a valid Instrument?   
Identification requires that land ownership is exogenous conditional on program 
participation. The exogeneity of land ownership is a plausible assumption. The validity 
of the land-based eligibility criterion as an instrument is also defended at length by PK, 
and Pitt (1999) in response to Morduch’s (1998) critique. Morduch (1998) argues that 
PK data show a great deal of turnover in the land market. However, our data confirm 
very low turnover in the land market: only 12.8 percent of households purchased land 
and 9.5 percent of households sold land in the five year period prior to the survey. This 
turnover rate does not differ between program and control villages. So, the land market 
is not active in our survey area. We do not find evidence that households endogenously 
sort themselves out in response to the half-acre eligibility rule. Since credit is extended 
mainly for qrq-djulfxowxudosxusrvhv ( self-employment activities) households having 
more land are exogenously ruled out. However, there are some participating households 
that own more than half an acre of land. Those households are currently not actively 
engaged in agriculture or the land is not fertile for cultivation, or sometimes there is 11
mistargeting, as perfect monitoring is not possible. The eligibility rule is set to simply 
identify the poverty status of the household.  Since land price and quality also vary 
between different regions, a household having more than half an acre of land is also 
considered to be poor in some regions. So, sometimes the loan officer or branch manager 
made their own judgement over the poverty status of the households upon their field 
visit. Note that, in general, richer households get credit at a softer term from formal 
markets, or through other means. Also there are social norms that bar them from 
becoming members of a microcredit organization. Rich people in rural areas still hesitate 
to become members of MFI, because they consider MFI as an organization for the poor. 
Thus the use of program eligibility criterion as an instrument for treatment in 
microfinance is well justified here. Moreover, in order to allow Yim to vary with the level 
of the landholding status, in our regression specification in equation (1), we also use the 
amount of land by household as an explanatory variable. So Z is likely to satisfy the 
exclusion restriction.
12 For Z to be a valid instrument the vector X2 should include all 
the village level characteristics that the MFI may use to decide program placement. We 
do so by exploiting the rich information collected at the village level and so the vector 
X2 includes variables such as education, health, electricity, irrigation, prices, labour 
market conditions and infrastructure in the village.
13
We check whether the eligibility criterion does satisfy the properties of an instrument. 
First, we need a strong first-stage to ensure that we are not using a weak instrument. 
We estimate a probit model of participation in the first stage using equation (2). There 
is a strong first stage here though the relationship between participation and eligibility 
is not deterministic (see Figure 2b). The coefficient estimate is positive and also 
economically significant — implying that eligibility is significantly related to the 
participation. We then check whether eligibility affects consumption expenditure only 
12 The key identifying assumption that underlies estimation using ] as an instrument is that any effects of 
eligibility on consumption are adequately controlled by the household land ownership included in [1 in 
equation (1) and partialled out of Z by the inclusion of land ownership in [1 in equation (2).
13 It may be argued that MFIs base their selections on the unobserved characteristics of the target 
population in each village, rather than on the entire population of the village. In that case, our estimations 
would be inconsistent. So, we also experimented with PK’s method of using separate fixed effects for target 
and non-target populations in each village (estimates involve more than 300 fixed effects). Our conclusions 
do not change with this specification (the results are available upon request). However, as we argued 
before, non-random selection of village is less important in our sample as most of the villages in the sub-
districts we surveyed were under the microfinance program. Moreover, the largest sample of non-
participants in our survey comes from program villages. So, we argue the concern regarding non-random 
program placement is not an important issue in our case once we control for village level observed 
covariates and fixed effects. 12
through the credit program participation. We estimate a semi-reduced form equation, in 
which participation is instrumented but eligibility enters the second stage regression 
directly (and naturally in the first stage regression). The results do not indicate any 
significant effect of eligibility in any of the specifications. We also estimate a reduced 
form regression regressing consumption expenditure on eligibility status, and we do not 
find any significant effect. Finally, we consider if there is a discontinuity in the 
conditional mean of consumption expenditure at the cut-off of eligibility. If we look at 
the Figure 1, we observe no discontinuity. We also check the possible discontinuity in 
outcomes in treatment villages but not in control villages and we do not find any such. 
This is expected since the relationship between land ownership and consumption 
expenditure is not obvious, and microcredit is provided to either landless households or 
households who are not much active in land cultivation.  
4. Estimation Results 
4.1 Differences-in-Differences Estimates 
In the following, we evaluate the impact of microfinance on household total monthly 
food consumption expenditure and per-capita monthly food consumption expenditure. 
The dependent variable in the regression is the log of each expenditure measure. Based 
on household eligibility for the microfinance program, we first specify the following 
functional form: 
(3)  \ lm=3+4Ym+ 5Hl+ 6Zlm + *7[1l+ *8[2m+ )lm
where Ylm is the log of consumption expenditure of household l in village m. With this 
specification, (4+6) measures the difference in the conditional expectation between 
eligible households in the program village and that of eligible households in the control 
village. Similarly, į3 is the difference-in-difference (DD) of mean log consumption 
expenditure. It captures the difference in conditional consumption expenditure between 
eligible and non-eligible in program villages that is over and above the difference in 
control villages. 
Reduced form estimates of equation (3) using OLS are reported in Table 4. The 
covariates included in X1 and X2 are presented in the Appendix (see the list of 
variables). The top panel of Table 4 shows the coefficient estimates of the impact on the 
log of household total consumption expenditure by male and female households, and by 13
land ownership. The estimated coefficient į3 is always positive, indicating that the 
eligible households in the program village are better off due to the presence of the 
program. The results are similar for the coefficient estimates of the effect on per-capita 
consumption expenditures as shown in the bottom panel of Table 4. The coefficient 6 is
also known as the ITT effect. The estimates in Table 4 indicate that the average ITT 
effect is approximately 4-8 percent. The results imply that eligible households in 
program villages are positively impacted by the presence of the program.
14 It also shows 
that simple difference estimates with just the eligible in program and control villages 
would have understated the effect of eligibility by neglecting ineligible groups in both 
villages.  
The advantage of using eligibility, rather than receiving the treatment, is that we have 
effectively eliminated the problem of non-compliance. There is no reason to believe that 
non-compliance would occur in the process of assigning households into the eligible 
group. The estimated impact on the corresponding participant is, however, likely to be 
biased downward since not all program eligibles in the treatment village received the 
treatment. Thus we cannot interpret the estimate as average effect per participant or 
TOT. Our DD estimates are thus diluted due to imperfect take-up rates. However, the 
estimation of the effect of eligibility is one of the most important parameters to 
estimate, and the estimation of ITT requires less restrictive assumptions than that of 
TOT. ITT thus likely provides a lower bound of the size of the TOT. 
4.2 Instrumental Variable Estimates 
We estimate the TOT effect using ITT as an instrument for treatment. Indeed, policy 
makers or practitioners are probably more interested in the TOT parameter. We 
consider two measures for Gl: (i) an indicator of whether the household is a current 
member of microfinance (binary treatment indicator); and (ii) the cumulative amount of 
credit borrowed (continuous treatment measure).  
14 Most of the coefficients are statistically insignificant, but are sizeable in economic terms. This issue 
reappears throughout the study. We suspect this result is due to sampling error. However, this problem is 
common even with using U.S. CPS data. For example, Card (1992) encountered the same problem in his 
analysis of California’s 1988 minimum-wage hike. See also Hamermesh and Trejo (2000) who also 
encountered similar problem to analyse the effect of overtime penalty on hours work. For more details on 
this issue, see McCloskey and Ziliak (1996) who suggest looking at economic significance of the results 
instead of its statistical significance. Note also that there need not be any relationship between weak 
reduced form and significance for IV estimates. So the statistical significance of the IV estimates of the 
effects of microfinance is independent of the reduced form estimates presented here. 14
We first consider a special case of an IV estimate –the Wald estimator, which is the 
ratio of the two ITTs: the effect of Z on Y divided by the effect of Z on D. Table 5 
displays the results of the Wald estimates. The first panel reports the estimated 
treatment effect corresponding to the log of total consumption expenditure. In the first 
row we present estimates of the program impact using a binary treatment indicator. The 
coefficient estimates are negative and statistically significant for the whole sample and 
for the male and female samples individually. All the coefficient estimates are positive 
when we restrict each group to the eligible sample. The results are similar when we 
change the participation measure. Table 5 shows a statistically significant positive 
treatment effect for the eligible sub-sample of men and women groups when we consider 
per-capita consumption expenditure (second panel). The point estimate is stronger for 
eligible female borrowers compared to their male counterparts if we look at total 
consumption expenditure. However, the stronger positive effect is observed for the 
eligible male sub-sample when we consider the impact on per capita consumption.  
The Wald estimator is based on the assumption that nothing other than the differences 
in the probability of participation is responsible for differences in consumption 
expenditure. A more efficient estimate would exploit all the available information that 
both accounts for the households’ decision to participate in microfinance and for the 
outcomes of interest. Below we estimate treatment effects using equations (1) and (2) 
for various sub-samples of households based on their land ownership.  
4.2.1 How Participation Impacts consumption 
We present the estimated treatment effect using a binary treatment measure in the first 
row in each panel of Table 6-7. In the top panel of each Table we consider the samples 
of both men and women together. The middle panel reports results for female borrowers, 
and the bottom panel presents the same for the male group of borrowers. Consider panel 
1 in Table 6 where we present IV estimates of program impact of participation of men 
and women on (the log of) total household monthly consumption expenditure.
15 The 
estimated treatment effects are all positive when we limit our samples of households 
15 The sample used here is choice-based: program participants were oversampled relative to the population. 
So we use weighted IV estimates (Hirano, Imbens and Rider 2003) where each program group member 
receives a weight of 1, and each comparison group member receives a weight of s/(1-s), wheresis the 
propensity score.  The propensity score adjustment does not alter the qualitative conclusion, which holds 
whether we weight or not. So we report the unweighted results here (the weighted results are available on 
request). 15
with land ownership of less than or equal to 2 acres. The results show that participation 
in microfinance increases household consumption expenditure by about 5 percent for all 
households who own 2 acres or less land. For women, the treatment effects 
monotonically increase as the amount of land a household owns decreases. When we 
consider the full sample, the estimated impact on the log of total monthly consumption 
expenditure is negative. The corresponding estimates are positive, and are larger in the 
case of male group households for samples of  2 acres and 1 acre of land ownership, but 
then it gets weaker compared to the female group. 
The mean impacts of participation on the log of monthly per-capita consumption 
expenditure are given in Table 7. The results are similar to the effects on total 
household consumption expenditure. For example, limiting the samples to households 
owning two acres or less of land, households’ participation in microfinance increases the 
log of per-capita consumption expenditure by .037. The overall results indicate that 
treatment effects are positive when the samples are restricted to two acres of land. But 
for the male group, the positive impact is observed from 5 acres of land. Again we 
observe monotonically increasing effects of treatment for women borrowers as their land-
holdings decrease. The treatment effects vary with land ownership and gender of 
participant, and they are typically higher for the male group. It should, however, be 
noted that male borrowers have higher averages of credit borrowed through 
microfinance. They also have more members, as participants in microfinance per 
household and the average length of participation in microfinance is also higher. The IV 
estimates suggest that effects of participation on eligible households are larger than the 
corresponding reduced-form estimates for all households having two acres or less land. 
The estimated coefficients are less precisely estimated as the sample size increasingly 
shrinks.
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4.2.2 How Credit Impacts Consumption 
A weakness of the binary treatment approach above is that it classifies all treated 
beneficiaries in the same way, despite the fact that some households have received 
significantly larger amounts of credit than others. Since the extent of the treatment 
varies greatly among treated households, we report results using the amount of credit 
16 Combining the regression by adding dummy variables for the sex of the borrowers, or by interacting 
dummies for different groups of land ownership with treatment status reduce the standard errors slightly, 
but not significantly. We prefer separate estimation for each group of land ownership and sex of the 
borrowers, as it allows us to compare IV estimates with those of PSM estimates (see next section). 16
borrowed as the treatment variable. The first stage involves estimating the credit 
demand equation using a Tobit model. The coefficient of the excluded instrument 
(eligibility) in the first stage is highly significant both statistically and economically. 
The second stage results, using the same specification as above, are reported in the 
second row of each panel of Table 6-7. . The estimates are positive for samples of 
households having less than or equal to two acres of land, and for males it is positive 
from the 5 acres of land ownership. The average value of credit borrowed by the 
households of 2 acres or less of land is tk. 3849.5.
17 So the estimate in row two in the top 
panel of Table 6 implies an increase in household total monthly consumption 
expenditure by about tk. 160, or 6.9 percentage points for both gender groups together. 
Similarly when the samples are restricted to only eligible group members, participating 
households enjoy an increase of about 13.3 percent of total consumption expenditures. 
The estimated effects are higher for male borrowers. 
The effects of credit on household per-capita monthly food consumption are presented in 
row two of each panel of Table 7. The coefficients are positive from samples that include 
households of less than or equal to two acres of land. For male samples, the estimates 
are all positive except in column 1. In terms of magnitude, all eligible participants 
benefit from an increase in consumption expenditure of 13.6 percent. Using the binary 
treatment measure, we see that the estimated increase in consumption is 168 taka which 
corresponds to a percentage impact of 7.2. The corresponding increase in per-capita 
consumption is 8.2 percent when we consider all households of two acres or less land. 
We obtain different program effects when we consider men and women groups 
separately; we see the positive effects on men and women but the size of the effects 
differs widely between men and women borrowers. The effects of participation or credit 
are negative when we consider the entire sample of participants. In general, we find 
slightly larger coefficient estimates (especially for men) using continuous rather than the 
binary treatment measures. 
4.2.3 Treatment Intensity as the Instrument 
Households living in different villages borrowed varying amounts. It appears that there 
is wide variation in the amount of credit borrowed by participants across different 
villages (Figure 3). Thus, the IV method can be improved upon by recognizing that 
17 In 1998, 35 taka =1US$ (approx.) 17
some villages have participated in the programs longer than others.
18 So we can exploit 
the across-village variation in the intensity of treatment to capture the variation in the 
amount of loan borrowed across households in different villages. Explicitly, the 
instrument is:  
Z= V × E × wuhdwphqwlqwhqvlw|
where ‘treatment intensity’ is measured by the number of years of microfinance program 
placement in a particular village. We also use interactions with ‘year of program 
placement dummies’ as instruments. In particular, we use the following instrument:  
¦ u u  
t
t Villyear E V Z
where ‘Villyear’ is the year dummy variable for the introduction of program in different 
villages. We report results on the effect of the log of per-capita food consumption 
expenditure in Table 8. The first panel shows the coefficient estimates of the impact of 
microcredit using a single instrument - ‘years of program placement in a village’ - 
interacted with the indicator of eligibility status in a program village. We observe the 
positive program effect in all cases starting from the households owning two acres of 
land and less. The impacts typically vary between 8 and 14 percent depending on the 
gender of participant and samples of different land group. The effects are higher on the 
male borrower group than the female group. We present the corresponding 2SLS 
estimates using multiple instruments in the second panel of Table 8. The estimates 
constructed using larger instrument sets differ little from those using a single instrument 
(in the top panel).  We find statistically significant positive effects of microfinance on all 
borrowers owning one acre or lower amounts of land. In the case of the landless, the 
coefficients are statistically significant for both groups, individually and jointly. All 
households, having one acre or less land, enjoy an increase in food consumption of 13 
percent for participating in a microcredit program. If we consider just the landless 
households, they gain more (25 percent). So our results indicate that over-identified 
estimates computed using the multiple instrument set are more precisely estimated than 
the just-identified estimates. However, the resulting efficiency gains are not dramatic: 
the standard error of estimates falls slightly with similar coefficient estimates. The p-
values of the F-statistics (for both men and women group samples) of the 
overidentifying restrictions test are shown in square brackets in the bottom panel of 
18 82% of the participants in our sample are members of a MFI for more than a year. 18
Table 8. The p-values indicate that over-identifying restrictions cannot be rejected at 
any reasonable level for any sample of households.  
4.3 Interpreting the IV Estimates
As mentioned previously non-compliance exists — it is not the case that all eligible 
households in the treatment villages participate in the microfinance program. On the 
other hand, some ineligible (non-encouraged) households end up receiving the treatment. 
So we characterize the households affected by the IV approach. The relationship 
between microfinance program participation (Dl) and its effect on food consumption 
expenditure (\l) can be analysed only for the subpopulation that is affected by the 
instrument. Imbens and Angrist (1994), and Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996) (AIR 
from here on), identify this subgroup of units as ‘compliers’, and the resulting estimate 
is called local average treatment effect (LATE). In our case, when using the binary 
treatment indicator, LATE is the average program effect on food consumption 
expenditure for those households who choose to participate in microfinance only because 
they are eligible to borrow. Similarly, the IV estimator exploiting more than one 
instrument is the average of the various single instrument LATE estimators that we 
would obtain using each instrument separately. In this case the weights are proportional 
to the effect of each instrument on the treatment variable: the bigger the impact of the 
instrument on the regressor, the more weight it receives in the IV estimation (Angrist 
and Imbens 1995).
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The LATE-IV is based on the two assumptions: the conditional independence 
assumption (CIA) and the monotonocity assumption.  The monotonocity assumption 
implies that anyone in the population who would take microcredit in the absence of 
eligibility would also take credit if they became eligible. The assumption requires that 
eligibility can make participation in microfinance more likely, not less, and that there is 
no one in the eligible households who actually was denied the credit (i.e., Dl=1|Zl=1 
Dl=1|Zl=0 or Dl=0|Zl=1  Dl=0|Zl=0 for all l). The assumption assures that there are 
no ghilhuv and that frpsolhuv exist. Since credit is offered for non-agricultural purposes, 
there is no reason to think that households choose not to participate in microcredit 
19 The interpretation of LATE also applies in the case of non-binary IVs and non-binary endogenous 
regressors (see Angrist and Kruger 1999; Frolich 2007). In our case when G is the amount of credit 
borrowed, the compliance intensity can differ among units. Hence a change in Z induces a variety of 
different reactions in G, which cannot be disentangled. Only a weighted average of these effects can be 
identified. For more on this issue see Frolich (2007) 19
when they have little land while they would participate when they possess more land. 
The data also find little use of loan - only 18 percent of the respondents mentioned a 
fraction of the loan was used for land cultivation purpose. Moreover, we do not find a 
significant difference between eligible and ineligible groups among those who use the 
loan for main agricultural activities. The CIA is based on the two requirements: (l)
comparison between outcomes for the households exposed to different values of Z
identifies the causal impact of the instrument; and (ll) the instrument does not directly 
affect the outcomes. The first requirement is satisfied since eligibility status is assigned 
by the MFI and thus exogenous to the households. The second requirement is un-
testable but we have seen previously that our instrument plausibly satisfies the 
exclusion restriction.
20
The LATE has very appealing properties in terms of a policy perspective and it is a 
well-defined economic parameter. Although our estimates capture the treatment effect 
only for a particular subset of participants, this subset is of great interest from the 
program perspective. Most of the households in our samples, and the microfinance 
program in Bangladesh, in general, are compliers.
21 Microfinance programs are generally 
designed for the poor landless (or marginal landholding) households to whom our 
estimates apply. The IV/2SLS allows causal effects among a very particular subset of 
household: those affected by eligibility criterion. Therefore, the results reported above 
need not generalize to the households of all participants. In a world of heterogeneous 
program impacts, LATE and TOT are likely to differ and the differences can be a 
matter for policy purposes.  
5. Evaluation using an Alternative Approach 
5.1 Propensity Score Matching (PSM) Method 
Below we estimate the treatment effect using the PSM method of Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983). PSM estimators permit us to estimate the impact of a treatment on the 
treated, and to check the consistency of the results under different assumptions about 
specification and identification. The main purpose of using PSM is to examine whether 
20 AIR show that the stronger the first-stage, the less sensitive the IV estimand to the violations of the 
monotonicity and CIA assumptions. They also show that the smaller the proportions of defiers, the smaller 
the bias will be from violations of monotonicity assumption. Also if the causal effects of treatment on 
outcome are identical for defiers and compliers, violations of the monotonicity assumption generate no bias. 
21 Following Angrist and Chen (2007) the proportion of households that are compliers is P[Gi1-
Gi0|Gi=1]=P[H=1]{P[Gi1-Gi0=1/P[Gl=1]}, where H=1 whether household is eligible, and P stands for 
probability. For the whole sample, this calculation is .677*(.506/.575)=.596.  20
our basic results hold across different evaluation methods. PSM also provides us a 
different parameter of interest (TOT) as opposed to IV estimates (LATE).
22
In order to identify the TOT parameter by the PSM technique, our identifying 
assumption is that outcomes in the untreated state are independent of Gl conditional on 
a set of observable village and household level characteristics. Rubin (1978) refers to the 
treatment status that is independent of potential outcomes as an ljqrudeoh treatment 
assignment. Although claims for ignorable are usually implausible in a non-experimental 
setting, it is more plausible in our context that microcredit program status among the 
program village is ignorable conditional on land holdings and a vector of other 
covariates. Households in program villages that have less land and non-land assets are 
likely to participate more. MFI selects households on the basis of eligibility and 
characteristics that can be observed by a loan officer and a branch manager. It is 
unlikely that a loan officer, who is unfamiliar to the villagers, could observe an 
applicant’s entrepreneurial ability and drive. However, some treated households are not 
eligible and that all eligible households do not participate in the program introduces a 
potential selection bias. The sources of bias could be the differences in observable 
variables in terms of household size, sex ratio, schooling, age, family composition, and 
other household characteristics. The survey contains information on most of the 
characteristics (including the reasons for participation or not participation in the 
program) that are potential determinants of households’ participation in microfinance. 
Given the richness of data available, we may be willing to assume conditional 
independence, i.e. selection bias can be eliminated using matching on the covariates.
 23 In 
that case, identification is based on the claim that after conditioning on all observed 
characteristics that are known to affect participant status, participants and non-
participants are comparable. 
We move to a step further to alleviate concern regarding selection bias. In particular, we 
use the regression-adjusted matching estimator developed by Heckman, Ichimura, and 
Todd (1997). The research by Heckman and his co-authors, Hahn (1998) and many 
22 If the selection on observable assumption does not hold the PSM estimates can be interpreted as ITT 
rather than TOT. 
23 The work by Heckman, his co-authors and others (Dehejia and Wahba 1999, 2002; Michalopoulos, Bloom 
and Hill 2004) points out that matching estimators perform well when (1) the same questionnaires are used 
for participants and non-participants; (2) participants and non-participants reside in the same geographic 
area; and (3) the data contain a rich set of variables relevant to modelling the program-participation 
decision.  Our data meet all these criteria. 21
others suggest that regression adjustment improves the precision of matching estimate 
more than by conditioning on propensity score alone. In the regression-adjusted version 
the residual from the regression of Y0j on a vector of exogenous covariates replaces Y0j as 
the dependent variable in the matching. Formally, assume a conventional linear model 
for outcomes in the matched comparison group Y3= Xȕ3+U3 (the regression is only run 
on the matched comparison group so it is not contaminated by program participation). 
Using partial regression methods applied to the comparison group sample, estimate the 
components of E[Y0|X,D=0]=Xȕ0+E[U0|X,D=0] imposing any desired exclusion 
restriction. We first use local linear regression (LLR) weight and use a bi-weight kernel 
in estimating local linear matching.
24 We then use Nearest Neighbour Matching (NNM). 
In our empirical work we use the five nearest neighbours. Each of these neighbours 
receives an equal weight in constructing the counterfactual means. We use matching 
with replacement where a given non-participant is allowed to match to more than one 
participant.  
Our sample is choice-based, with program participants oversampled relative to their 
frequency in the population. Therefore, we use matching on the estimate of the odds 
ratio. We impose the common support restriction based on the method of trimming that 
was suggested by Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997). In addition, we exclude the two 
percent of the remaining treatment observations that show the lowest odds-ratio of the 
non-treated observations. We follow Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997), Behrman, 
Cheng, and Todd (2004), and Rubin and Thomas (2000) for variable selection to 
estimate the propensity score and regression adjustment. We include all the variables 
that may affect both program participation and outcomes. The estimates produced by 
matching can be quite sensitive to the choice of covariates used to construct propensity 
score (see Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd 1998; Heckman and Navarro-Lozano 
2004). So we use two different specifications to estimate the propensity score. First we 
use a covariate specification similar to the IV specification. Then we use a more 
generous specification that includes the detailed household demographic and socio-
economic variable and village level characteristics. The list of the full controls is chosen 
from a set of larger controls, and we chose those that were most often significant in both 
outcome equation and estimation of propensity score. The final list of variables included 
24 The LLR is analogous to running a weighted regression for each program household on only a constant 
term using all the non-participant data. It is a nonparametric regression technique that improves upon 
kernel matching. It avoids the boundary points bias associated with kernel, and it can also adapt better to 
different data densities. 22
in the matching estimates is reported in the Appendix. Since the list of observed 
covariates is rich, and additionally we are using regression adjustment, we may claim 
that we are able to reach sufficiently plausible conclusion using a matching technique.   
5.2 PSM Results 
We estimate a standard logit model of participation to estimate propensity scores. The 
results, not reported for brevity, indicate that program participants are more likely to be 
eligible households. The empirical distribution of the estimated odds-ratio of participants 
and non-participants are shown in Figure 4 using the coarser set of covariates. It can be 
seen that there are very few regions of non-overlapping support. For our estimation we 
exclude non-participants in the non-overlap region, if there is any. Observations with 
very low or high logs of odds-ratio values are also eliminated as they may indicate a true 
value of zero or one. However, as is seen in Figure 4, we need to discard only very few 
observations of the treatment group.
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In Table 9 we present estimates of the treatment parameters using two different 
matching estimators. The dependent variable is the level of consumption expenditure, as 
opposed to its logarithm, since many of the coefficient estimates are very small in 
percentage terms. The average difference in food consumption expenditure between 
treated households and their non-treated counterparts provides the basis for the 
estimation of the TOT parameter. The first panel of Table 9 shows the results of both 
male and female groups together using two covariate specifications of the propensity 
score. The left side of the Table reports the results based on a coarser set of covariates 
and the right side presents the results using the same covariate specification used in the 
IV estimation. The second and third panels represent the corresponding results for 
female and male groups of borrowers, respectively. All the results are based on the 
regression-adjusted covariates. Each column of Table 9 represents estimates based on 
the matched sample of households of different groups of land ownership.  
The results for mean impact indicate that the effect of participation on total household 
consumption is negative for the whole sample. All the results point out that the 
treatment effect is positive for those households who own less land ( one acre of land). 
Both the LLR and NNM matching estimates give us similar results in both specifications 
25 It appears that the imposition of common support is not critical in our application using different sets of 
covariates for estimating propensity scores.  23
of the propensity score estimates. We observe similar results for the female group of 
borrowers. However, all TOT coefficients are positive for male groups. The results are 
also similar to those obtained from two different matching estimators. The impact 
estimate is higher for male than for female borrowers. Adding controls for estimating 
propensity score and regression adjustment does not affect the point estimates much.  
Table 10 provides the coefficients of the estimated mean impact on monthly per-capita 
food consumption expenditure using the same matching estimators. Since the results are 
not affected by the choice of propensity score estimation we report results based on a 
broader set of specifications. The results are similar to that of impact on total monthly 
consumption. All the estimated coefficients are positive starting from the samples of 
households with one acre of land, and for male groups the treatment effects are always 
positive. The size of the estimated impact varies with respect to matching estimates and 
the different groups of land holding households. Overall we find here a stronger 
coefficient for men than women.  
5.3 Spillover Effects 
Our identification strategy is based on the implicit assumption that there is no spill-over 
effect. Formally we make the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) which 
assumes that (l) the household’s potential outcomes depend on its own participation 
only and not on the treatment status of other households; and (ll) the microfinance 
program only affects the outcome of those who participate, and that there is no 
externality from participant to non-participant. Thus it rules out peer and general 
equilibrium effects. So, in order to interpret our estimates as TOT effect, the SUTVA 
must hold. We examine (ll) by estimating the spillover effects. Accordingly, we check 
whether program affects consumption of non-treated households who live in the 
treatment villages. The difference in the unconditional mean household monthly food 
consumption expenditure between non-treated in program and control villages is less 
than 1 percent of their household monthly consumption expenditure. The difference, 
though in favour of households in the program village, is not statistically significant. 
There is also no difference in unconditional food consumption expenditure between 
eligible non-participants in program and control villages. To increase the precision of 
estimates we add a set of conditioning variables and run OLS regressions for all non-
treated households where the parameter of interest is an indicator variable of whether 
the household lives in a treatment village. The estimated coefficient is very small and 24
negative for the full sample of non-participants, while it is also very small but positive 
for the eligible sub-sample (results not reported here). We then use regression adjusted 
matching estimates to ensure that we are comparing similar non-participants, and find 
no support in favour of spillover. We also compare eligible non-treated households who 
have the same probability of participation, were the program available, and also find no 
indication of spillover effects. Thus there is no strong evidence in favour of a positive 
spillover effect.
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6.1 IV versus Matching Estimates 
We now compare the main results from IV and matching estimates. We see that the 
results are similar in terms of the sign of the coefficient estimate. Both estimation results 
suggest that the effects are positive for a subset of borrowers; those having less land. In 
terms of the magnitude of the coefficients, the matching estimates are substantially 
smaller than the IV estimates.
27 The estimated standard errors are larger in case of 
matching than the IV estimates. Therefore, unlike IV estimates that show modest 
positive effects on the consumption of eligible or other poorer participants, matching 
estimates leads to smaller positive and statistically insignificant effects on consumption. 
The lack of statistical significance in the coefficient estimates is partially the results of 
the smaller sample size (see also footnote 14). The divergence between IV and PSM 
estimates in terms of standard error is probably best explained by differences in the 
heterogeneity among households. The matching estimator combines propensity score 
weighting schemes to estimate the TOT. Households most likely to participate get the 
highest weights in matching estimates. On the other hand, IV produces covariate-
specific variance weighted average effects. The two weighting schemes are likely to cause 
different estimates (Angrist and Krueger 1999).
28 Moreover, our matching estimates only 
consider extensive margin (where all treated households are classified in the same way) 
but not intensive margin (intensity of the treatment). Treating differently treated 
26  However, to the extent that the change in behaviour and therefore the resulting program impacts among 
the treated influence their peers within the group, we are not correct in claiming that there are no spillover 
effects. In the presence of violation of SUTVA, our estimates are the lower bound to the true effects.  
27Since IV estimates are all in terms of logarithms we multiply IV estimates by household total 
consumption expenditures in order to compare the IV with the matching estimates. 
28See Heckman and Navarro-Lozano (2004) for more details for comparisons between matching and IV 
based on treatment parameters. 25
households as the same, as a binary approach would do, thus seems likely to understate 
the potential effect of full treatment of microcredit.
29,30
The two estimates produce results for two different subgroups of borrowers. The IV 
estimate applies to a smaller treatment group than the matching estimates. The larger 
coefficient estimates by IV rather than matching implies that the impacts of 
microfinance for the ‘compliers’ are higher than ‘always-takers’. This result might be 
counterintuitive in the sense that the treatment effect for the marginal group (poorer 
households) should be smaller than the average treatment effect on the treated. 
However, this need not be the case here because IV estimates the impact of the program 
for those households that are more credit constrained and/or have greater immediate 
need to improve their consumption. They are also more likely to participate in a 
microcredit program. So, it is possible that gains from participation are higher for them. 
While IV is a standard technique for non-experimental impact estimates, recent evidence 
in favour of matching is compelling. However, there is no guarantee that selection on 
observables will eliminate the total bias (unless they go in the same direction). So, 
matching estimates may still be biased if there are any latent factors correlated with 
participation decision and counterfactual outcomes.
31 The IV method can overcome these 
problems: Under IV assumptions and the assumed functional form, IV estimation 
identifies the causal effect robustly to unobserved heterogeneity. However, the IV 
estimates are valid for the group of compliers and may not be informative for the other 
group (always-takers).
32
29PSM techniques are generally confined to binary treatment scenarios. However, some possible extensions 
have been suggested. For example, Hirano and Imbens (2004) develop a generalized propensity score 
method when treatment is defined as a continuous variable. 
30 Angrist (1998) finds larger standard error of estimates in covariate matching than the estimates obtained 
using IV. Zhao (2006) compares the performance of PSM and covariate matching estimators, and finds 
that PSM estimators have larger standard errors. So our results are consistent with both Angrist and Zhao. 
31Blundell, Dearden and Sianesi (2005) argue that the plausibility of the selection on observable assumption 
of PSM method should always be discussed on a case-by-case basis. In our case, the assumption seems 
reasonable due to informational richness of the data, and the simple mechanism (land-based eligibility 
criterion) for participation into the program. However, there are some complexities as well since a number 
of households from the ineligible group received treatment and some eligibles did not take up the program. 
So, the divergence between IV and PSM could also be due to unobserved heterogeneity in the selection 
process. See Attanasio and Vera-Hernandez (2004) for a related issue in the context of evaluation of a large 
nutrition program in Columbia.
32Our results indicate that the concern regarding selection bias in non-experimental data can be less 
problematic if the researcher establishes good interactions with borrowers and providers before evaluating 
the program. In particular, one needs to know how MFI selects villages and households, and why 
households enter programs. It is, however, to be noted that we do not rely on (regression-adjusted) 
matching results to conclude our findings since the possibility of selection based on observables could still 26
6.2 Summary and Conclusion 
Using different non-experimental impact evaluation techniques we find similar results 
concerning the impact of microfinance. We use different instruments and our results are 
robust to the use of instruments. Overall, the results indicate that they do not entirely 
depend on different specification and identifying assumptions. We also estimate the 
heterogeneous treatment effect by estimating the sub-group specific mean treatment 
effect where the groups are categorized based on the targeting criterion. Our approach is 
novel in the sense that we do not estimate treatment effects based on an outcome 
variable, such as quantile treatment effects which suffers from the strong assumption of 
rank preservation (Bitler, Gelbach and Hoynes 2006). The results indicate that there is 
substantial heterogeneity in the causal impact of participation in microfinance.  
The overall results suggest that the effect of microfinance on household consumption 
expenditure does not seem to be strong. It raises the doubt of whether microfinance can 
be a first-track poverty reduction program. The IV estimates indicate an increase of 6 to 
14 percent in the consumption expenditure of the relatively poor participating 
households. Overall, results signify that, conditional on positive impacts, stronger 
coefficient estimates are observed for men participants. However, men participants 
borrow more, so larger treatment impact could be the results of increasing returns in 
household enterprises. The results for men are based on a very small sample size, and 
should be interpreted with caution. Note that these results are not directly comparable 
with PK’s study since we are considering different set of MFIs, and there is no overlap 
in the households/MFIs evaluated by these two studies.  
In general, we find an inverse relationship between household land ownership and the 
benefits from participation in microcredit program: the lower the amount of land a 
household has the stronger is the effect of participation in microfinance. The benefits are 
lower, or sometimes even negative, for those households marginal to the participation 
decision. The results indicate that the effects of microfinance loans are not strong across 
all groups of poor households. Rather, those among the poorest of poor participants are 
be questionable (see, for example, Angelucci and Attanasio (2006) who argue against standard matching 
approach for non-random assignment of the program, and non-random participation into the program. 
They propose semi-parametric estimator by combining matching and IV approach). We do not use 
standard PSM estimate, and we think that the PSM results are at least indicative. 27
most likely to benefit from participating.
33 The results also imply that microcredit loans 
may not be effective for land-rich households. Moreover, they are not the focus of the 
microcredit loans as these groups are not officially eligible. They are also less likely to 
participate in a microfinance program. The findings indicate that the simple targeting 
mechanism of microfinance program in Bangladesh based on household land ownership 
is effective. Hence the efficiency of the microfinance program can be enhanced by 
allocating credit to those, namely the poorest marginal landholding households, for 
which the impact is the greatest.  
33 The results may have different interpretations. For example, credit may induce poorer households to 
increase their consumption while it may not have any sizeable effect on consumption of a relatively less 
poor because they might invest their money on a long-term project. However, MFI requires that loans to 
invested and be repaid within a year with payment start about four weeks later upon receiving the loan. It 
may still be possible that the poorer households use their loan more to augment consumption. My field 
visits do not support the claim. Also the survey data regarding the use of loans indicate that more than 90 
percent of all treated households use loan for productive investment and that there is no difference between 
poorer and less poor households in this respect. Moreover, MFIs monitor the use of loan, and because of 
the repayment concern (unlike cash transfer program like Progressa) almost in each week, households 
cannot sustain their higher level consumption without investing money.  28
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Primary  school  90.91 86.25 -4.66  0.42 
Secondary school  27.27  31.25  3.98  0.26 
Maktab/ Madrasa (Religious School)  81.82  90.00  8.18  0.80 
Health Facilities: 
Union health centre  10  17.5  7.5  -0.59 
Allopathic doctor  50  42.5  -7.5  0.45 
Homeopath doctor  40  38.75  -1.25  0.08 
Allopathic medicine store  80  45  -35  2.12 
Transport, Communication and Infrastructure: 
Electricity connection   17  26  9  3.2 
Presence of pucca road  10.6  34.8  24.2  8.4 
  Distance to nearest Thana (in km)  11.91  7.14  -4.77  -2.07 
  Presence of grocery market  18.2  22.5  4.3  0.33 
  Presence or absence of frequent haat (big market)  27.3  32.5  5.2  0.35 
  Presence of bus stand  9.1  15  5.9  0.59 
  Presence of post office  18.2 20 1.8  0.14
  Presence of telephone office  9.1  6.3  -2.8  -0.3 
  Presence of Union Parishad (local Government) office  18.2  13.8  -4.4  -0.35 
Irrigation Equipment: 
  Number of low lift pump 0.27  0.44  0.16  0.23 
 Number  of  shallow tube-well 11.82  12.13  0.31  0.05 
  Number of hand tube-well for drinking water  68  78.04  10.04  0.39 
Credit related options: 
  Percentage of crop received by land owner in sharecropping  49.55  47.53  -2.02  0.96 
  Number of money lenders from this village  3.73  7.91  4.19  2.4 
  Number of people who provides advances against crops  2.73  3.85  1.12  0.79 
   Number of small credit/savings groups  0.91  0.76  -0.15  -0.39 
Notes: The first column of the Table presents the mean of each variable for the control villages, and the second 
presents the same for the treatment villages. The third column presents the difference between the two, and the 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Total of Amount Credit 
(Taka) 
4650.9 3799.4  851.6  0.000  0.015 
(3961.7) (2115.2)  (176.1)     
Total Length of  
Membership (in years) 
4.1 3.3 0.8  0.000  0.001 
(3.4) (2.7) (0.2)    
Number of Borrowers  
per Household 




2783.6 2365.0  418.5  0.001  0.003 
(2192.3) (1723.2)  (130.4)     
Household Per-capita 
Consumption  
497.6 436.5  61.1  0.013  0.002 
(394.0) (325.4)  (24.3)     





value K-S   
Household monthly Food  
Consumption (tk.) 
2415.1 2456.6  41.5  0.730 0 
(1801.1) (1890.9)  (67.7)     
Household monthly Per-capita  
Food Consumption (tk) 
443.3 467.7  24.4  0.049  0.022 
(336.1) (337.4)  (12.4)     
Household monthly Food  
Consumption in program village (tk.) 
2417.8 2461.8  44.1  0.550  0.112 
(1806.9) (1942.7)  (73.6)     
Per-capita monthly Food  
Consumption in program Village (tk)  
444.3 477.8  33.5  0.014  0.028 
(337.0) (358.3)  (13.7)     
Notes: The top panel represents the descriptive statistics of the selected variables for men and women 
participants in microfinance. The bottom panel gives the descriptive statistics of the treatment and 
comparison households. Reported p-values are the two-tailed tests of the null hypothesis that column II and I 
are equal. (K-S) based on Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equality of distribution, Standard errors are in 
parenthesis 
         Table 4- Difference-in-difference Estimates: The Impacts of Eligibility 




All sample  Land 500 Land  200 Land  100 Land  50 Landless
į1 -0.015 -0.021 -0.051  -0.027  0.038 0.051 
(0.046) (0.047) (0.054) (0.077) (0.034) (0.040)
į2 -0.104 -0.0983 -0.0788 -0.0361     
(.0520)**  (.0549)+ (.0644) (.0866)
į3 0.0471 0.0532 0.0826  0.0628     
 (.0523)  (.0531)  (.0588)  (.0799)     
į1+į3 0.0321 0.0322 0.0316  0.0358  0.038 0.051 
Dependent Variable: Log of Per Capita Monthly Food Consumption Expenditure 
į1 -0.023 -0.026 -0.048 -0.025 0.039  0.048 
(0.046) (0.047) (0.054) (0.077) (0.035) (0.041)
į2 -0.104 -0.092  -0.068  -0.0337 
 (.0522)**  (.0550)+  (.0647)  (.0872)     
į3 0.0541 0.057  0.0794  0.0592 
(.0525) (.0532) (.0591) (.0804)
į1+į3 0.0311  0.031 0.0314  0.0342 0.039  0.048 
Notes: Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses, + significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant 
at 1%. Coefficients are those from estimation of reduced form equation (4). Regressions also include household and 
village level characteristics and MFI fixed effects. 34 
Table 5- Wald Estimates of Impacts of Microfinance 
Dependent Variable: Household Log of Total Monthly Food Consumption Expenditure 
Treatment Variable  All  All eligible  Women  Eligible Women  Men  Eligible  Men  
Whether treated 
or not  
-1.345 0.249  -1.313  0.219  -1.434  0.102 
(0.146)* (0.292)  (0.148)*  (0.295)  (0.146)*  (0.342) 
Total amount of credit
1 -0.8746  0.1616 -0.8430  0.1381  -0.8864  0.0631 
 (0.0605)*  (0.1183) (0.0620)*  (0.11589)  (0.0896)*  (0.1385) 
Dependent Variable: Log of Per Capita Monthly Food Consumption Expenditure 
Participation Variable  All  All eligible  Women  Eligible Women  Men  Eligible  Men  
Whether treated 
or not 
-0.621 0.312  -0.633  0.273  -0.552  0.386 
(0.121)* (0.258)  (0.122)*  (0.260)  (0.190)*  (0.264) 
Total amount of credit
1 -0.4042  0.2024  -0.4080  0.1722  -0.3419  0.2392 
 (0.0522)*  (0.1020)**  (0.0535)*  (0.0997)+  (0.0752)*  (0.1173)** 
Notes: Each cell in the Table corresponds to a separate regression. The first row in each panel represents regression 
of log of consumption expenditure on a dummy for treatment status using eligibility status as instrument for 
treatment. The second row of each panel reports the corresponding estimated coefficients using continuous treatment 
measure (the amount of credit borrowed).  Regressions do not include any other covariate. Clustered standard errors 
are reported in parentheses, + significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%. 
1 Coefficient estimates 
and the corresponding standard errors are multiplied by the average amount of credit borrowed by households of the 
respective group of land ownership (assuming constant marginal benefit from the credit).  
Table 6- IV Estimates of Impact of Microfinance on Household Consumption 
(Dependent variable: Household Log of Total Monthly Food Consumption Expenditure) 
Both Men and Women
Treatment Variable













Whether treated  
or not 
-0.216 -0.131  0.049 0.128  0.126  0.156  (0.46-0.49) 
(0.102)** (0.113) (0.129)  (0.140) (0.164) (0.193)   
Amount of credit
1 -0.1282  -0.0660  0.0692  0.1173  0.1335  0.1745  (0.46-0.49) 
 (0.0660)+  (0.0738)  (0.0885)  (0.0984)  (0.1186)  (0.1374)   
Mean Consumption (Tk.)  2432.7  2384.3  2319.1  2228.9  2126.3  2082.8   
Observations  3026  2960 2780  2462 2034 1471   
Women                      
Whether treated 
or not 
-0.21 -0.157  0.027 0.109  0.149  0.218  (0.46-0.49) 
(0.107)+ (0.116) (0.132)  (0.144) (0.167) (0.197)   
Amount of credit
1 -0.1308  -0.0978  0.0357  0.0830  0.1160  0.1886  (0.46-0.49) 
 (0.0688)+  (0.0754)  (0.0880)  (0.0976)  (0.1191)  (0.1387)   
Mean Consumption (Tk.)  2406.1  2359.5  2302.8  2216.5  2108.0  2067.3   
Observations  2813  2755 2591  2299 1904 1377   
Men                      
Whether treated 
or not 
-0.151 -0.013  0.146  0.21 0.051  0.124  (0.52-0.55) 
(0.154)  (0.168) (0.190)  (0.210) (0.248) (0.299)   
Amount of credit
1 -0.0360  0.0849  0.2602  0.2898  0.2299  0.2520  (0.52-0.55) 
 (0.122)  (0.1340)  (0.1500)+  (0.1548)+  (0.1753)  (0.2159)   
Mean Consumption (Tk.)  2505.2  2436.8  2350.0  2215.4  2120.8  2085.2   
Observations 1461  1420  1305  1127  922  673     
Notes: Each cell in the Table corresponds to a separate regression. The first row in each panel represents a separate 
regression of log of total household monthly consumption expenditure on a dummy for treatment status, controlling 
for household and village level characteristics and MFI fixed effects, and using eligibility status of household as 
instrument for treatment indicator. The second row of each panel reports the corresponding estimated coefficients 
using continuous treatment measure (the amount of credit borrowed). Clustered standard errors are reported in 
parentheses, + significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%. 
1 Coefficient estimates and the corresponding 
standard errors are multiplied by the average amount of credit borrowed by households of the respective group of land ownership
(assuming constant marginal benefit from the credit).35 
Table 7- IV Estimates of Impact of Microfinance on Per-capita Consumption 
(Dependent Variable: Log of Per-capita Monthly Food Consumption Expenditure)
 Notes: Each cell in the Table corresponds to a separate regression.  The first row in each panel represents a separate 
regression of log of per-capita monthly consumption expenditure on a dummy for treatment status, controlling for 
household and village level characteristics and MFI fixed effects, and using eligibility status as instrument for 
treatment. The second row of each panel reports the corresponding estimated coefficients using continuous treatment 
measure (the amount of credit borrowed). Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses, + significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%. 
1 Coefficient estimates and the corresponding standard errors are multiplied 
by the average amount of credit borrowed by households of the respective group of land ownership (assuming constant 
marginal benefit from the credit).  
Both Men and Women
Treatment Variable
Household Land Ownership(in decimal)  Adjusted 
 R
2 All sample  Land 500 Land  200 Land100 Land  50 Landless 
Whether treated 
or not 
-0.203 -0.119 0.037  0.080  0.072 0.086  (0.26-0.28) 
(0.103)** (0.113)  (0.129)  (0.141)  (0.165)  (0.197)   
Amount of credit
1 -0.1071  -0.0437  0.0826  0.1109  0.1361  0.1670  (0.26-0.28) 
 (0.0677)  (0.0756)  (0.0885)  (0.0977)  (0.1196)  (0.1415)   
Per-capita Consumption (Tk.)  453.7  449.9  444.4  435.2  423.6  415.1   
Observations 3026  2960  2780  2462  2034  1471     
Women                      
Whether  treated 
or not 
-0.177 -0.14 0.019  0.066 0.104 0.151  (0.25-0.28) 
(0.108) (0.116) (0.133)  (0.145) (0.168)  (0.201)   
Amount of credit
1 -0.098)  -0.0734  0.0494  0.0784  0.1234  0.1809  (0.25-0.28) 
 (0.0690)  (0.0756)  (0.0884)  (0.0983)  (0.1199)  (0.1412)   
Per-capita Consumption (Tk.)  450.5  446.8  442.4  433.2  420.1  413.1   
Observations 2813  2755  2591  2299  1904  1377   
Men                      
Whether  treated 
or not 
-0.143 0.014 0.171  0.188 0.038 0.099  (0.30-0.33) 
(0.156) (0.170) (0.192)  (0.213) (0.252)  (0.309)   
Amount of credit
1 -0.0142  0.1256  0.3015  0.2992  0.2443  0.2470  (0.30-0.33) 
 (0.1230)  (0.1352)  (0.1515)**  (0.1571)+  (0.1782)  (0.2229)   
Per-capita Consumption (Tk.)  472.8  466.1  459.2  444.7  437.5  427.2   
Observations 1461  1420  1305  1127  922  673     36 
Table 8- 2SLS Estimates of Impact of Participation in Microfinance 
(Dependent Variable: Household Log of Per-Capita monthly Food Consumption Expenditure) 
Instrument: Y ×E ×the number of years in microfinance in program village 
Household Land Ownership(in decimal) 
All sample  Land 500 Land  200 Land  100 Land  50 Landless  Adjusted  R
2
All -0.0645  -0.0080  0.0812  0.1183  0.0579  0.1360  (0.26-0.28) 
 (0.0671)  (0.07160  (0.0785)  (0.0838)  (0.0956)  (0.1118)   
Women -0.0491  -0.0186  0.0674 0.1039  0.0583  0.1440 (0.26-0.28) 
 (0.0702)  (0.0741)  (0.0813)  (0.0866)  (0.0988)  (0.1156)   
Men -0.0481  0.0684  0.2044  0.1883  0.1357  0.3045  (0.31-0.33) 
 (0.1234)  (0.1319)  (0.1431)  (0.1447)  (0.1572)  (0.1959)   
Instrument: Y ×E × separate dummies for each year in microfinance in program village  
 All  sample  Land  500 Land  200 Land  100 Land  50 Landless  Adjusted  R
2
All -0.0323  0.0187  0.1040  0.1304  0.1127  0.2467  (0.26-0.28) 
 -.0581  -.0625  .0689  (.07.33)+  -.0813  (.0952)*   
F-test  [p= 0.008]  [p= 0.004]  [p= 0.000]  [p= 0.000]  [p= 0.000]  [p= 0.000]   
Women -0.0241  .0001  0.0813 0.1094  0.0969  0.2446 (0.26-0.28) 
   (0.0588)  (0.0624)  (0.0690)  (0.0740)  (0.0823)**  (0.0962)**    
Men  -0.0252  0.07257 0.1834  0.1677  0.1428  0.3014 (0.31-0.33) 
 (0.1053)  (0.1129)  (0.1222)  (0.1221)  (0.1279)  (0.158012)+   
Notes: Each cell in the Table corresponds to a separate regression of log of per-capita monthly consumption 
expenditure on amount of credit borrowed as treatment variable, controlling for household and village level 
characteristics and MFI fixed effects. Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses, + significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; * significant at 1%. All the Coefficient estimates and the corresponding standard errors are 
multiplied by the average amount of credit borrowed by households of the respective group of land ownership 
(assuming constant marginal benefit from the credit). The F-test is for whether the coefficients on the excluded 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 10- Matching Estimates of the Impact of Participation in Microfinance  
(Dependent Variable: Household Monthly Per-capita Food Consumption Expenditure (in Taka)) 
Regression Adjusted 
Estimates of  
(Estimation based on full set of covariates) 
All sample  Land 500 Land  200 Land  100 Land  50 Landless 
  Both Women and Men 
Local  Linear  -1.26 0.70 -1.34 7.10  8.08  5.79 
  (14.67) (14.52) (15.08) (15.86)  (16.20)  (19.12) 
          
Nearest  
5-neighbour 
-10.53  7.29 0.77 7.23  10.66  7.36 
(15.40) (15.31) (16.04) (16.68)  (16.73)  (20.21) 
Women 
Local Linear  -4.56  -1.49  1.38  10.44  8.15  9.39 
  (15.23) (15.03) (15.72) (16.54)  (16.65)  (20.35) 
          
Nearest  
5-neighbour 
-2.66 -1.20 1.76 13.28  6.67  6.52 
(16.40) (15.96) (16.38) (16.72)  (16.27)  (19.79) 
Men
Local  Linear  10.11 14.35 12.43 27.22  59.91  26.58 
  33.43 32.83 32.98 42.93  63.56  43.14 
          
Nearest  
5-neighbour  
15.81 14.60  5.23  7.68  27.75  18.20 
(31.60) (33.60) (33.90) (34.06)  (41.14)  (49.05) 
Notes:  Bootstrapped standard errors are shown (in parentheses) for local linear estimator. They are based on 100 
replications with 100% sampling. Standard errors for the nearest neighbour estimator are based on Abadie and Imbens 
(2006). In the estimation of LLR matching the densities were estimated using a bi-weight kernel and a fixed 
bandwidth of 0.06.The full set of covariates includes a coarser set of specifications listed in the Appendix. All the 
coefficients estimation is carried out using regression-adjusted version of the corresponding matching estimator.  39
Figure 1a: Household consumption expenditure by land ownership
Notes: Figure shows regression un-adjusted household monthly consumption expenditure (in taka) by land ownership. 
Land  50 implies household who own less than or equal to 50 decimal (half-acre) land, and so on.  
Figure 1b: Per-capita consumption expenditure by land ownership 
Notes: Figure shows regression un-adjusted per-capita consumption expenditure (in taka) by land ownership. Land 
50 implies household who own less than or equal to 50 decimal (half-acre) land, and so on.   40
Figure 2a: Participant Rate by Household Land Holding 
Notes: Figure shows lowess locally weighted regression of the amount of land owned by households on their probability 
of participation in microfinance (using quartic kernel with bandwidth of 0.8 ). Regression-adjusted probability of 
participation is obtanied by conditioing on household and village level characteristics, MFI fixed effects, and 
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Figure 2: Participation probability by land ownership
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Number of years a MFI is avilable in a village
Figure 3:  Years of Microfinance Program in a Village and Credit Borrowed by Households
Notes: Average credit per household in a village is the amount of credit borrwed (in taka) by all households divided by 
the number of participating households in a program village. Number of years a MFI is available in a village is the 
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Figure 4: The Empirical density of the log of odds-ratio42
Appendix 
List of Variables:  
Variables used in IV estimation and Program Participation Model 
Household Level variables: 
Age of household head, Square of the age of household head, Sex of household head, Marital status of 
household head, Education level of household head and spouse (illiterate, can sign only, can read only, can 
read and write), Whether household head has spouse, Highest grade achieved by a member in the 
household, total arable land owned by household, Number of children age below 6 years, age 6-15, 
Dependency ratio, Number of 15-60 years old male and female member, Type of family (joint family or 
semi-nuclear, nuclear ), Dummies for occupation of the household head (farmer, agricultural labour, non-
agricultural labour, self-employed or businessman, professional or salaried job holder, any other job), 
Electricity connection, Number of living room (beside bathroom/kitchen), If cement or brick used in any 
of the living room, Whether condition of house is good, liveable, or dirty, Whether household has separate 
kitchen, toilet facility.  
Village level Variable:  
Presence or absence of primary school, secondary school or college, health facility, Adult male wage in the 
village, presence of brick-built road, regular market, post office, local government office, youth 
organization, Distance to nearest thana, Number of money lenders, large farmers/traders who provides 
advances against crops in the village, Number of small credit/savings groups in the village, Price of Rice, 
wheat, oil, potato. 
Additional Variables used in estimating the Propensity Score: 
Additional covariates used in the PSM estimator are household demographic and socio-economic variables 
decomposed into various categories (e.g., age is divided into different groups), additional household level 
variable (e.g., number of daughter, son) additional village level characteristics (e.g., average male, female 
daily wage). This is a larger set of variables and interactions that are selected to maximize the percentage 
of observation classified under the model.